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ABSTRACT 
The theory of belief unctions is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of sub- 
jective probability judgment. The author's 1976 book, A Mathematical Theory of 
Evidence, is still a standard reference for this theory, but it is concerned primarily 
with mathematical foundations. Since 1976, considerable work has been done on 
interpretation and implementation f the theory. This article reviews this work, as 
well as newer work on mathematical foundations. It also considers the place of 
belief functions within the broader topic of probability and the place of probability 
within the larger set o f formalisms used by artificial intelligence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of belief functions provides one way to use mathematical prob- 
ability in subjective judgment. It is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of 
subjective probability. When we use the Bayesian theory to quantify judgments 
about a question, we must assign probabilities to the possible answers to that 
question. The theory of belief functions is more flexible; it allows us to derive 
degrees of belief for a question from probabilities for a related question. These 
degrees of belief may or may not have the mathematical properties of probabil- 
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ities; how much they differ from probabilities will depend on how closely the 
two questions are related. 
Examples of what we would now call belief function reasoning can be found 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, well before Bayesian ideas 
were developed. In 1689, George Hooper gave rules for combining testimony 
that can be recognized as special cases of Dempster's rule for combining belief 
functions (Shafer [90]). Similar rules were formulated by Jakob Bernoulli in 
his Ars Conjectandi, published posthumously in 1713, and by Johann-Heinrich 
Lambert in his Neues Organon, published in 1764 (Shafer [84]). 
Examples of belief function reasoning can also be found in more recent work 
by authors who were unaware of the seventeenth and eighteenth century work. 
For example, Per Olof Ekel6f, a Swedish legal scholar, reinvented Hooper's 
rules in the early 1960s (Shafer [90], G~denfors et al. [37]). 
In its present generality, however, the theory of belief functions is due to 
Arthur P. Dempster and myself. Dempster set out the basic ideas of the theory 
in a series of articles in the 1960s. I developed the theory further and established 
its terminology and notation in 1976 in A Mathematical Theory of Evidence 
[82]. Because of the role of Dempster and myself, the theory is sometimes 
called the "Dempster-Shafer theory." 
My 1976 monograph is still the most comprehensive source of information on 
belief functions. Unfortunately, it says little about interpretation, implementa- 
tion, or computation. It is concerned primarily with mathematical foundations. 
During the past fifteen years, a great deal has been learned about he interpre- 
tation, implementation, and computation of belief functions, and fresh progress 
has been made on the mathematical foundations as well. This work is scattered 
in journals in a wide variety of fields, including statistics, psychology, philoso- 
phy, engineering, accounting, and artificial intelligence. No one has drawn the 
new work together in a comprehensive way. 
This article is primarily a summary of my own current views. It pulls to- 
gether some of the strands in the scattered literature, but it falls short of the 
comprehensive r view that is needed. Though the bibliography is lengthy, it is 
not comprehensive. My failure to mention particular contributions should not 
be taken as an indication of disinterest or disagreement. 
I begin with some opinions about the place of belief functions in the larger 
tool drawer of probabilistic methods and about the place of this whole tool 
drawer in artificial intelligence (Sections 2 and 3). These opinions are personal. 
I expect hat few readers will agree with them fully. They may nonetheless 
serve to dispel some misunderstandings about the scope of the theory of belief 
functions. 
After this general introduction, I introduce the basic ideas of belief unctions, 
in a way that should be accessible to readers with no previous familiarity with the 
topic (Section 4), and I review the many competing mathematical formulations 
of the theory (Section 5). 
I then turn to issues of interpretation a d semantics. I explain that belief unc- 
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tion degrees of belief should not be interpreted as lower bounds on unknown 
probabilities (Section 6). Instead, they should be given a process-oriented se- 
mantics; they are the result of deliberately drawing a certain analogy (Section 
7). 
I then turn to issues closer to implementation. I discuss how the concept of 
independence is used in belief function reasoning (Section 8) and how belief 
functions can and cannot be used in reasoning about frequency distributions 
(Section 9). I discuss how the computational complexity of belief functions can 
be dealt with (Section 10). And I discuss the extent o which belief function 
reasoning can be automated (Section 11). 
Finally, I discuss briefly a number of other topics in belief function 
theory--generalizations, decision methods, consensus, infinite frames, weights 
of evidence, and other mathematical dvances (Section 12). 
2. THE PLACE OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS IN PROBABILITY 
In my earliest work on belief functions [81-83] I took a youthfully ambitious 
view of their possible role. I saw belief functions as a very general tool for 
subjective judgment. Almost every item of evidence could be represented, I 
suggested, by a belief function. 
By the early 1980s, however, I was expressing a more sober view (see es- 
pecially Ref. 86). Then, as now, I saw belief functions as one among many 
tools for making subjective judgments using probability. Other such tools in- 
clude Bayesian probability, Fisherian tests of significance, and Neyman-Pearson 
confidence intervals. 
It was once customary to equate Bayesian methods with subjective probability 
and to identify Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson methods with a frequentist con- 
ception of probability. These were the terms of the debate that raged between 
Bayesians and frequentists in the 1960s. In recent years, however, the debate 
has cooled, and both sides have acknowledged that subjectivity is involved in 
all applications of probability to real problems. 
In recent work [96], I have tried to give a foundation to this emerging con- 
sensus by advancing the thesis that the mathematical theory of probability is 
really the theory of an ideal picture in which belief, fair price, and knowledge 
of the long run are bound together. Probabilities in this ideal picture are long- 
run frequencies, but they are also degrees of belief, because they are known 
and nothing else that is relevant is known. This ideal picture seldom occurs 
in nature, but there are many ways to make it relevant o real problems. In 
some cases, the ideal picture serves as a standard of comparison--Fisherian 
tests of significance are often used to compare correlations in real problems to 
accidental correlations in the ideal picture. In other cases, we simulate the ideal 
picture (we obtain random numbers from tables or numerical algorithms) and 
then deliberately entangle this simulation in a real problem (we use the random 
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numbers to randomize xperiments or draw random samples). In other cases, 
we draw an analogy between the state of knowledge in the ideal picture and our 
evidence in a real problem. 
Subjectivity is involved in all these applications of probability, not only be- 
cause it is involved in the ideal picture, but also because the comparison, entan- 
glement, or analogy that relates the ideal picture to the real problem requires 
subjective judgment. 
Bayesian methods rely on one particular type of analogy that can be drawn 
to the ideal picture. In this analogy, we compare our evidence about the an- 
swer to a question of interest to knowledge of frequencies in the ideal picture. 
This analogy is strongest when extensive frequency data are available for our 
problem (in this case, it is customary to talk about "empirical Bayes"). When 
our evidence does not consist of frequencies, the analogy may or may not be 
convincing. 
Belief functions arise when the Bayesian type of analogy is drawn between the 
ideal picture and one question, and then the resulting probabilities are examined 
for their relevance to a related question that is of greater interest o us but 
for which we do not have a convincing direct Bayesian analogy. Here, as in 
the Bayesian case, there is no guarantee that the argument by analogy will be 
convincing. But if there are a number of questions that are related to the question 
of interest, then we may have a chance to find a successful analogy between the 
ideal picture and our evidence for at least one of these questions (Shafer and 
Tversky [101]). 
Which of these many different ways of using probability is most important in 
practice? Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson applications are by far the most com- 
mon and most important. Bayesian applications have been steadily increasing 
in recent decades. There are still few belief function applications. I expect both 
the dominance of Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson applications and the steady 
increase in Bayesian applications to continue. I am also optimistic that the num- 
ber of belief function applications will continue to increase as the ideas of the 
theory become more widely understood. 
3. THE ROLE OF PROBABILITY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
What role has probability played in AI, and what role should it play? Does 
probability provide a general theory for handling uncertainty in AI? In this 
section, I review the history of probability in AI, and I argue that we should 
be modest and realistic about the future prospects for probability in AI. 
Historically, probability has not played a strong role in the theory of AI. 
Beginning with the inception of AI as a field in the 1950s, the theory of AI 
has been dominated by logic. On the other hand, there has always been a role 
for probability in AI applications. Standard probabilistic and statistical methods 
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have long been used in AI work in pattern recognition and learning (Nilsson 
[71], Duda and Hart [31]), and recently probabilistic ideas and techniques have 
been used in expert systems (Spiegelhalter [112]). 
The drive to make logic a foundation for AI has faltered in recent years. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, logicians in AI were still optimistic about ex- 
tending logic to deal with commonsense or uncertain reasoning, and the term 
"nonmonotonic logic" was coined as a general name for such extensions. As 
the 1980s drew to a close, however, the promise of nonmonotonic logic faded, 
and some of its most prominent original proponents questioned the fundamental 
idea of using logic for practical reasoning (see especially McDermott [66]). 
Does the faltering role of logic mean that it should be replaced by prob- 
ability as a general foundation for AI? A number of probabilists, including 
Cheeseman [12] and Pearl [74], believe that it should. These probabilists point 
out that uncertainty is involved in the vast majority of AI problems, and they 
repeat general arguments by Savage [79], Cox [15], and others to the effect hat 
probability is always appropriate for dealing with uncertainty. In my opinion, 
this line of thinking is misguided. Common sense tells us that there are many 
situations involving uncertainty in which the theory of probability is not useful. 
The arguments advanced by Savage and Cox should be seen as clarifications 
of subjective probability, not as demonstrations that it is always appropriate 
(Shafer [91, 95]). The cause of probability in AI will be better served, in the 
long run, by a realistic and modest assessment of its limitations and potential. 
The mere fact that there is uncertainty in a problem does not mean that 
the theory of probability is useful in solving the problem. As I pointed out in 
the preceding section, the theory of probability is really about a special ideal 
picture, not about all situations involving uncertainty. Bringing the theory of 
probability to bear on a particular problem means relating it in some way to the 
ideal picture. This requires imagination, and success is not guaranteed. Even if 
there is a way to bring the ideal picture to bear on a problem, doing so may not 
be worth the trouble. In many AI applications, it is more sensible to generate 
one plausible guess or plan than to weigh probabilities. In others, it is more 
efficient o give more reliable sources of information priority in a hierarchical 
system of control than to weigh the probabilities of each report from these 
sources (Brooks [11], Cohen [14]). 
Since the ideal picture of probability involves frequencies, probability is most 
easily applied when relevant frequencies are available. Artificial intelligence is
no exception to the rule that frequentist applications far outnumber subjective 
applications. The applications to pattern recognition and learning are predomi- 
nantly frequentist, as are the most successful current applications of probability 
to expert systems. Pearl [74] has emphasized the potential of subjective judge- 
ment in causal models, arguing that causal models are persuasive ven when 
frequencies are replaced by subjective guesses. But this persuasiveness i  not 
always matched by reliability. Numerous tudies have shown that simple actu- 
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arial rules of thumb, when they are available, are more reliable than subjective 
clinical judgment (Dawes et al. [16]). 
Finding ways of using probability--or alternatives to probability--when di- 
rectly relevant frequencies are not available should be seen as a difficult task. 
It is not a task that can be disposed of by general normative arguments uch 
as those of Savage. It is not a task that can be disposed of by finding the right 
alternative calculus, such as the theory of belief functions or Zadeh's theory of 
possibility measures (Zadeh [136]). It is a task that must be dealt with in the 
context of each application. 
4. THE BASIC IDEAS OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
The theory of belief functions is based on two ideas: the idea of obtaining 
degrees of belief for one question from subjective probabilities for a related 
question, and Dempster's rule for combining such degrees of belief when they 
are based on independent items of evidence. 
The simplest way to illustrate these ideas is to go back to the topic addressed 
by George Hooper in 1689, the reliability of testimony. The belief function 
approach to testimony is to derive degrees of belief for statements made by 
witnesses from subjective probabilities for the reliability of these witnesses. 
Suppose that Betty tells me a tree limb fell on my car. My subjective probabil- 
ity that Betty is reliable is 0.9; my subjective probability that she is unreliable is 
0.1. Since they are probabilities, these numbers add to 1. But Betty's tatement, 
which must true if she is reliable, is not necessarily false if she is unreliable. 
So I say that her testimony alone justifies a 0.9 degree of belief that a limb fell 
on my car, but only a zero degree of belief (not a 0.1 degree of belief) that no 
limb fell on my car. This zero does not mean that I am sure that no limb fell 
on my car, as a zero probability would; it merely means that Betty's testimony 
gives me no reason to believe that no limb fell on my car. The 0.9 and the zero 
together constitute a belief function. 
Dempster's rule is based on the standard idea of probabilistic independence, 
applied to the questions for which we have subjective probabilities. I can use 
the rule to combine vidence from two witnesses if I consider the first witness's 
reliability subjectively independent (before I take account of what the witnesses 
say) of the second's reliability. (This means that finding out whether one wit- 
ness is reliable would not change my subjective probability for whether the 
other is reliable.) The rule uses this subjective independence to determine joint 
probabilities for the various possibilities as to which of the two are reliable. 
After using independence to compute joint probabilities for who is reliable, 
I must check whether some possibilities are ruled out by what the witnesses 
say. (If Betty says a tree limb fell on my car and Sally says nothing fell on my 
car, then they cannot both be reliable.) I f  so, I normalize the probabilities of 
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the remaining possibilities o they add to 1. This is an example of probabilistic 
conditioning, and it may destroy the initial independence. (After I notice that 
Betty and Sally have contradicted each other, their reliabilities are no longer 
subjectively independent for me. Now finding out that one is reliable would 
tell me that the other is not.) After the normalization, I determine what each 
possibility for the reliabilities implies about he truth of what the witnesses aid, 
and I use the normalized probabilities to get new degrees of belief. 
The net effect of Dempster's rule is that concordant i ems of evidence rein- 
force each other, conflicting items of evidence rode each other, and a chain 
of reasoning is weaker than its weakest link. To illustrate this, consider two 
independent witnesses, say Betty and Sally. Suppose the reliabilities of Betty 
and Sally are Pl and 192, respectively; Betty's testimony gives us a degree of 
belief pt in what she says and degree of belief 0 in its denial, while Sally's 
testimony gives us a degree of belief P2 in what she says and degree of belief 
0 in its denial. Then we can derive the following formulas: 
• If Betty and Sally say exactly the same thing, our degree of belief in what 
they say will be 1 - (1 -p l ) (1  -/92). 
• If they make different but consistent assertions, our degree of belief in both 
assertions being true will be PIPE. 
• If  they make contradictory assertions, our degree of belief in Betty's as- 
sertion will be P1(1 -PE) / (1  --piPE), and our degree of belief in Sally's 
assertion will be/92(1 - -  pl ) / (1  - P IPE) .  
These formulas are derived in Chapter 4 of Ref. 82. They represent only the 
simplest examples of Dempster's rule. When we combine more complex belief 
functions, Dempster's rule becomes too complex to be represented informa- 
tively through simple formulas. 
5. THE MATHEMATICAL FORMALISM OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
The basic ideas of belief functions can be formalized mathematically in a 
variety of ways. In my 1976 monograph, I defined belief functions axiomati- 
caUy, and I defined Dempster's rule by a formula. Other approaches include 
multivalued mappings, compatibility relations, random subsets, and inner mea- 
sures. This section is concerned with these alternative approaches and with the 
relations among them. 
The choice among these alternatives should be seen as a matter of conve- 
nience in mathematical exposition and investigation. Since the alternatives are 
mathematically equivalent, it makes no fundamental difference which we take 
as the starting point in such mathematical work. 
In applications, the starting point does make a great deal of difference. But 
for applications we need more than a mathematical definition or a set of axioms 
as a starting point. We need a metaphor that can serve as a guide in relating a 
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practical problem to the theory and as a guide in assessing numbers to represent 
the strength of evidence in the practical problem. I will consider the problem of 
providing such metaphors in Section 7. The alternatives I discuss in this section 
are not such metaphors; they are merely mathematical formulations. 
In the simple example of Betty's testimony, we started with two questions: 
QI: Is Betty reliable? 
Q2: Did a tree limb fall on my car? 
We had probabilities for Q1, and we derived degrees of belief for Q2. This pro- 
cess required no formal notation, because both QI and Q2 had only two possible 
answers: yes and no. In more complex examples, we will have questions Q1 and 
Q2 with many possible answers. To talk about such examples in general, we 
need a notation for each question's et of possible answers, a notation for the 
probabilities for Q1 and the degrees of belief for Q2, and a way of representing 
the constraints that an answer to Q1 may put on the answer to Q2. 
We assume that each question comes with an exhaustive list of mutually 
exclusive answers. We know that exactly one of these answers is correct, but 
we do not know which one. We call such a set of answers a frame. Let S be 
the frame for Q1, the question for which we have probabilities, and let T be 
the frame for Q2, the question of interest. 
Let us write P(s) for the probability of the element s of S. Given these 
probabilities, and given a subset A of T, we want to derive a degree of belief 
Bel(A), our degree of belief that A contains the correct answer to Q2. 
An answer s to Q1 may rule out a whole set of answers to Q2. I rA  is a set of 
answers to Q2, and s rules out all the answers in A's  complement, T -A ,  then 
s tells us that the answer to Q2 is somewhere in A. Thus the probability P(s) 
should contribute to our belief in A. Our total degree of belief in A, Bel(A), 
should be the total probability for all answers that rule out all answers in 
T -A .  How shall we put this into symbols? 
Here is where paths diverge. Multivalued mappings, compatibility relations, 
random subsets, and inner measures all provide different ways of specifying 
mathematically the answers to Q2 ruled out by an answer to QI and hence 
different ways of explaining the relation between the probabilities on S and the 
degrees of belief on T. 
Multivalued Mappings 
Let us first consider multivalued mappings, which were used by Dempster in 
his early articles (e.g., Dempster [18]). 
Let us write F(s) for the subset of T consisting of the answers to Q2 that are 
not ruled out by s. In this notation, s tells us that the answer to Q2 is somewhere 
Theory and Practice of Belief Functions 331 
in A whenever 
F(s) C A 
The degree of belief Bel(A) will be the total probability for all answers that 
satisfy this condition. In symbols, 
Bel(A) = P {s[F(s) C A} (1) 
The mapping P is a multivalued mapping from S to T. Formally, a belief 
function is any function Bel given by (1) for some multivalued mapping F and 
some probability measure P. 
Now consider two belief functions Bell and Bel2 on T, which we judge to be 
based on independent items of evidence. Each belief function will be based on 
its own probability space and its own multivalued mapping from that probability 
space to T. We may write SI and Sz for the two probability spaces, P l  and 
P2 for the two probability measures, and I~1 and 1~2 for the two multivalued 
mappings. Dempster's rule is a rule for combining Bell and Bel2 to obtain a 
belief function Bel on T that represents the pooling of two items of evidence. 
How do we describe Dempster's rule in terms of $1, $2, P1, Pz, F1, and •27 
We can answer this question by using SI, $2, P I ,  P2, 1~1, and F2 to construct 
a probability space S, a probability measure P, and a multivalued mapping F 
from S to T. The belief function Bel given by combining Bell and Bel2 by 
Dempster's rule will be the belief function given by (1) using S, P, and Y. 
Independence of the two items of evidence means that we can make initial 
joint probability judgments about the two questions answered by Sl and $2 by 
forming the product measure Pl  × P2 on S~ × $2. It also means that what an 
element Sl of S1 tells us about Q2 does not affect what an element s2 of $2 
tells us about Q2; Sl and s2 together tell us only that the answer to Qz is in 
the intersection Fl(Sl) N 1-'z(s2). If this intersection is empty for some (Sl, s2), 
then Sl and s2 are telling us contradictory things about Q2, and one of them 
must be wrong. So we must condition the product measure Pl  x P2 on the set 
of (Sl, s2) for which F l (s0  N F2(s2) is not empty. We let S be the subset of 
S1 × $2 consisting of (Sl, $2) for which Fl(Sl) N F2($2) is not empty, and we 
let P be the probability measure on S obtained by conditioning P I × P2 on S. 
Finally, we let I" be the multivalued mapping from S to T given by 
~(SI, $2) = ~I(SI) ~ ~2($2) 
This completes the construction of S, P, F and hence the statement of Demp- 
ster's rule. 
To summarize verbally: Dempster's rule says to form the product probability 
space, condition it by eliminating pairs that map to disjoint subsets of T, and 
then obtain a belief function by mapping each remaining pair to the intersection 
of the subsets to which the two elements of the pair are mapped. 
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Compatibility Relations 
The multivalued mapping F from S to T tells us, for each element s of S, 
which elements of T are possible answers to Q2 if s is the correct answer to 
Q1. It tells us, in other words, which s's are compatible with which t's. This 
information can also be represented by specifying the set C of all ordered pairs 
(s, t) such that s is compatible with t. This is a "relation"--a subset of the 
Cartesian product S × T. The relation C is related to the multivalued mapping 
rby  
C = {(s,  t) lt  E r(s)} 
and 
In terms of C, (1) becomes 
or  ¸ 
r(s) = {tl(s, t) E C} 
BeI(A) = P {s l{t l (s ,  t) E C} CA} 
Bel(A) =P{sl i f(s,  t) EC, then t EA} (2) 
In Ref. 94 I call C a compatibility relation and develop the mathematics of 
belief unctions from (2). This is also the approach taken by Lowrance [64] and 
by Shafer and Srivastava [100]. 
In truth, the choice between multivalued mappings and compatibility rela- 
tions is scarcely more than a choice of terms. Many treatments of mathematical 
set theory (e.g., Kelley [49]) define mappings as relations. Moreover, Demp- 
ster used the word "compatible" repeatedly in explaining the meaning of his 
multivalued mappings. 
Random Subsets 
We have assigned a subset of T, F(s), to each s, and we have assigned a 
probability P(s) to each s. If we think of the probability as being attached to 
the subset instead of to s, then we have, in effect, defined a random subset of 
T. 
The subset F(s) might be the same for different s's. Therefore, to find the 
total probability that the random subset will be equal to B, we must add the 
probabilities of all the s's for which F(s) is equal to B. The degree of belief, 
BeI(A), is the total probability that the random subset is contained in A. 
In this setting, Dempster's rule is a rule for combining two random subsets to 
obtain a third, or, more precisely, a rule for combining two probability distribu- 
tions for random subsets to obtain a third. We assume that the random subsets 
Theory and Practice of Belief Functions 333 
are probabilistically independent, we intersect them, and then we condition the 
probability distribution for the intersection on its being nonempty. 
This approach to the mathematics of belief functions was emphasized by 
Nguyen [70], Goodman and Nguyen [40], and Shafer et al. [102]. It is con- 
venient for advanced mathematical exposition, because the idea of a random 
subset is well established among mathematical probabilists (Matheron [67]). 
The Axiomatic Approach 
Another approach is to characterize belief functions directly in terms of their 
mathematical properties. We simply list a set of axioms that a belief unction Bel 
must satisfy. And we use a formula to define Dempster's rule for combining two 
belief functions Bell and Bel2. This was my approach in early papers [81-83, 
85]. It is related to earlier mathematical work by Choquet [13]. 
In my 1976 monograph, I also gave a more transparent characterization for 
the case where T is finite. We assign a non-negative number e(B) to each 
subset B of T. Intuitively, re(B) is the probability that the random subset is 
equal to B. We require that m(~)  = 0, where ~ is the empty set, and that the 
m(B)'s add to 1. The function m is called the basic probability assignment. 
We define the function Bel by 
Bel(A) = ~ {m(B)IB C_ A} (3) 
As it turns out, the m(B) can then be recovered from the Bel(A) by the formula 
re(B) = ~ {(-1)  1`41BeI(A)IA C_ B} (4) 
The functions m and Bel are said to be M6bius transforms of each other (Rota 
[77]). Dempster's rule for combining two belief functions Bell and Bel2 can be 
defined by a relatively simple rule in terms of the corresponding basic proba- 
bility assignments ml and m2; we define m(B) by 
{ml(B1)m2(B2)lB1 f~B2 = B) 
m(B) = (5) 
{ml(Bl)m2(B2)lB1 AB2 ~ f~} 
The belief function Bel resulting from the combination can then be obtained 
from m by using (3). 
Many other authors, including Gordon and Shortliffe [41, 42], have used 
basic probability assignments o explain the theory of belief functions. 
Inner Probability 
The idea of deriving minimal degrees of belief for some sets from probabil- 
ities for other sets has long been familiar in abstract probability theory in the 
context of "inner measures" (Halmos [43]) or "inner probabilities" (Neveu 
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[69]). With attention to a few technicalities, we can relate belief functions to 
the idea of inner measure or inner probability. 
It is easiest o explain this using the compatibility relation C that relates 
the frames S and T. The set C is itself a frame--it consists of the possible 
answers to the joint question formed by compounding the question answered by 
S and the question answered by T. A Bayesian approach to our problem would 
construct a probability measure on C. The belief function approach stops short 
of completing this construction. We stop when we have constructed a probability 
measure P on S. We then extend P to an inner probability on C. 
Let us review the definition of inner probat~ility in the finite case. Recall that 
an algebra of subsets of a set X is a collection of subsets that includes X and 
the empty set ~ and also includes A n B, A U B, X - A, and X - B whenever 
it includes A and B. Given a probability measure Q defined only an algebra 
($ of subsets of a finite set X, the inner probability of Q is the function Q.  
defined by 
Q.(A) = max{Q(B)lB E O~ and B c_ A} (6) 
for every subset A of X. Intuitively, Q.(A) is the degree to which the proba- 
bilities for the elements of (~ force us to believe A. 
Let (~ denote the collection of all subsets of C of the form C M (R × T), 
where R is a subset of S. This is an algebra of subsets of C. Since the subset 
C n (R × T) of C has the same meaning (qua assertion about the answer to 
Q1) as the subset R of S, it is natural to define a probability measure Q on 6t 
by setting Q(C N (R × T)) = P(R). With this definition, (6) becomes 
Q,(A) = max{P(R)[R c S and C N (R × T) c_ A} (7) 
for every subset A of C. 
What belief should we give to a subset U of 7"?. It is natural to answer by 
looking at the value of (7) for the subset of C that corresponds to U, namely 
C fq (S × U). This is 
Q.(c  n (s  × u) )  
=max{P(R)lR c_s and C M(R xT)  C_CN(S × U)} 
= max{P(R) lR  C_ S and i f s  E R and (s, t) E C, then t E U} 
=P{s i i f ( s ,  t) CC, then t E U} 
which is the same as formula (2) for Bel(U). 
Thus a belief function is simply the inner measure of a probability 
measure-- or, more precisely, the restriction to a subalgebra of an inner measure 
obtained from a probability measure on a possibly different subalgebra. 
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This connection between inner measures and belief functions must have been 
known for some time to many students of belief functions. To the best of my 
knowledge, however, it has appeared in the literature only in the past few years. 
The only references I know are Ruspini [78] and Fagin and Halpern [33]. 
6. BELIEF FUNCTION DEGREES OF BELIEF ARE NOT 
LOWER BOUNDS 
In this section, I will review the point, well established in the literature on 
belief functions, that belief function degrees of belief should not be interpreted 
as bounds on unknown true probabilities. Such an interpretation seems plausible 
when we consider only a single belief function, but it breaks down when we 
consider belief functions that represent different and possibly conflicting items 
of evidence. Most important, a probability-bound interpretation is incompatible 
with Dempster's rule for combining belief functions. If we make up numbers 
by thinking of them as lower bounds on true probabilities, and we then com- 
bine these numbers by Dempster's rule, we are likely to obtain erroneous and 
misleading results. 
In order to see how the degrees of belief given by a belief function might be 
thought of as lower bounds on probabilities, consider again my 0.9 belief that 
a limb fell on my car and my zero belief that no limb fell on my car. These 
degrees of belief were derived from my 0.9 and 0.1 subjective probabilities 
for Betty being reliable or unreliable. Suppose these subjective probabilities 
were based on my knowledge of the frequency with which witnesses like Betty 
are reliable. Then I might think that the 10% of witnesses like Betty who are 
not reliable make true statements a definite (though unknown) proportion of 
the time and false statements he rest of the time. Were this the case, I could 
think in terms of a large population of statements made by witnesses like Betty. 
In this population, 90% of the statements would be true statements by reliable 
witnesses, x% would be true statements by unreliable witnesses, and (10 -x )% 
would be false statements by unreliable witnesses, where x is an unknown 
number between 0 and 10. The total chance of getting a true statement from 
this population would be (90 + x)%, and the total chance of getting a false 
statement would be (10 -x )%.  My degrees of belief of 0.9 and zero are lower 
bounds on these chances; since x is anything between 0 and 10, 0.9 is the lower 
bound for (90 +x)%,  and zero is the lower bound for (10 -x )%.  
As this example suggests, a single belief function is always a consistent 
system of probability bounds. For any belief function Bel over any finite frame 
T, there will exist a class of probability distributions 6) such that 
Bel(A) = min P(A) (8) 
PEa  ~ 
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for every subset A of T. [There are many ways of seeing that this is true. 
One way is to recall that Bel(A) is the sum of re(B) for all B contained in A. 
Consider the different probability distributions obtained by distributing the mass 
m(B), for each B, among the elements of B. If  B is contained in A, then all 
the mass has to fall in A, but if B is not contained in A, then it is possible to 
distribute it all outside of A. Hence the minimum probability that one of these 
distributions can give A is Bel(A).] 
However, the degrees of belief given by belief functions should not be in- 
terpreted as lower bounds on some unknown true probability. Belief functions 
are not, in general, concerned with a well-defined reference population or with 
learning about he frequencies in this population. And differences between belief 
functions do not, in general, reflect disagreements about unknown true prob- 
abilities. When Betty says a limb fell on may car, and Sally says nothing fell 
on my car, they are disagreeing about whether something fell on my car, not 
about the true probability of something having fallen on my car. 
Were we to insist on a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions, 
then we would be interested only in groups of belief functions whose degrees 
of belief, when interpreted as probability bounds, can be satisfied simultane- 
ously. But when belief functions are given their proper interpretation, it is of 
no particular significance whether there exist probabilities that simultaneously 
satisfy the bounds defined by a whole group of belief functions. Consider two 
cases that might arise when we use belief functions to represent contradictory 
evidence from Betty and Sally. 
CASE 1 Before hearing their testimony, we think highly of the reliability of both 
Betty and Sally. We represent Betty's evidence by a belief function that gives 
a 95% degree of belief to a limb having fallen on my car, and we represent 
Sally's evidence by a belief function that gives a 95% degree of belief to nothing 
having fallen on my car. In this case, the two belief functions are contradictory 
as probability bounds; if the true probability of a limb having fallen on my car 
is greater than 95%, then the true probability of nothing having fallen on my 
car cannot also be greater than 95%. 
CASE 2 Before hearing their testimony, we think that both Betty and Sally are 
fairly unreliable. So in both belief functions, we assign a 35% degree of belief 
rather than a 95% degree of belief. In this case, the two belief functions define 
consistent probability bounds; the true probability of a limb having fallen on 
my car and of nothing having fallen on my car can both be greater than 35%. 
From the belief function point of view, there is no conceptual difference 
between these two cases. In both cases, we can combine the two belief func- 
tions by Dempster's rule. In both cases, there is conflict in the evidence being 
combined, and normalization is required. 
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It can be shown that if no normalization is required in the combination of 
a group of belief functions by Dempster's rule, then there do exist consistent 
probabilities that simultaneously bound all the belief functions being combined 
as well as the belief function that results from the combination. This may also 
happen when normalization is required, as in case 1, but we cannot count 
on this. In general, a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions is 
inconsistent with normalization (Zadeh [137]). 
Probability bounds do provide another way to use the ideal picture of proba- 
bility in subjective judgment. I have called this the lower-probability approach 
in order to distinguish it from the belief function approach (Shafer [86]). The 
lower-probability approach as been elaborated by Smith [110], Good [38], 
Suppes [116], Levi [62], Kofler et al. [50], Nilsson [72], Snow [111], and 
others. It does not, in general, use Dempster's rule. 
When we use the lower-probability approach in a practical problem, we are 
drawing an analogy between actual evidence and knowledge of bounds on un- 
known true probabilities for the question of interest. Like the belief function 
approach, the lower-probability approach is sometimes but not always appro- 
priate and useful. To claim it is always appropriate is to fall into the trap of 
assuming that unknown true probabilities always exist. In general, they exist 
only if a population and sampling scheme are well defined. An unknown true 
probability for the truth of Betty's statement, for example, exists only if the 
population of true and false statements of witnesses like Betty is well defined. 
In some cases, a lower-probability analysis will come very close to a Bayesian 
analysis. Indeed, if the bounds we consider are fairly tight-- fairly close to defin- 
ing a single probability distribution--then they may correspond to bounds we 
would consider to see how slight changes in our subjective probability dis- 
tribution would affect the outcome of a Bayesian analysis. Some authors call 
this "sensitivity analysis" (Fishburn [35], Isaacs [45]); others call it "robust 
Bayesian analysis" (Kadane [47]). 
One contrast between the belief function and lower-probability approaches i  
in how they combine agiven belief unction Bel on a frame T with evidence that 
establishes that the answer is in a subset A of T. The belief function approach 
is to combine Bel by Dempster's rule with a new belief function that gives 
degree of belief 1 to A and degree of belief 0 to every proper subset of A. 
This generalizes Bayesian conditioning; I have called it Dempster's rule of 
conditioning. The lower-probability approach is to consider all the probability 
distributions bounded from below by the belief function, condition them all on 
A, and then take lower bounds over the resulting conditional probabilities. The 
lower-probability approach produces weaker degrees of belief than the belief 
function approach (Shafer [86], Kyburg [58]). 
Though applying (8) to an arbitrary class of probability distributions 6' does 
not always produce a belief function, it does produce a belief function sur- 
prisingly often (Wasserman [124]). Moreover, the lower-probability approach 
338 Glenn Sharer 
to conditioning a belief function produces another belief function (Fagin and 
Halpern [34]). These results show that belief functions are of greater interest 
to the lower-probability approach than one might have expected, but they do 
reconcile the two approaches from the point of view of application and inter- 
pretation. 
The point that belief functions are not lower bounds on probability measures 
is well accepted in the literature on belief functions. It is true that Dempster 
used the idea of bounds on unknown probabilities as a didactic tool in several 
of his articles on belief functions (which he then called "upper and lower 
probabilities") in the 1960s. The idea of probability bounds was never basic to 
Dempster's work, however; his work differed in this respect from the earlier 
work of Smith [110] and Good [38]. In my 1976 monograph, where I introduced 
both the name "belief function" and the notation now associated with belief 
functions, I explicitly disavowed the interpretation f belief function degrees of 
belief as lower bounds over classes of probabilities (Ref. 82, p. ix). In later 
articles, I have amplified, emphasized, and repeated this disavowal (Shafer [86, 
94], Shafer and Srivastava [100]). Dempster and other proponents of belief 
functions have seconded the disavowal (Dempster [24], Ruspini [78], Smets 
[109]). 
7. THE SEMANTICS OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
As I noted in Section 5, the use of belief functions in practical problems 
requires metaphors that can guide us in relating practical problems to the theory 
and in assessing the strength of evidence numerically. This is the practical 
meaning of calls for a "semantics" for belief unctions. In this section, I review 
the metaphors that I have suggested in the past as well as some of the suggestions 
others have made. 
In my mind, the simplest and most effective metaphor for belief functions is 
the metaphor of the witness who may or may not be reliable. In many cases, the 
example of such a witness can serve as a standard of comparison for the strength 
of evidence. We can assess given evidence by saying that it is comparable in 
strength to the evidence of a witness who has a certain chance of being reliable. 
A witness testifying to a specific proposition leads to a relatively simple be- 
lief function-- one that gives a specified egree of belief to that proposition and 
its consequences and zero degree of belief to all other propositions. Arbitrar- 
ily complex belief functions can be built up by combining such simple belief 
functions (Shafer [82], p. 200), but in some cases we may want to produce 
complex belief functions more directly, in order to represent evidence that con- 
veys a complex or mixed message but cannot be broken down into independent 
components. This requires more complex metaphors. 
In some cases, we can obtain the more complex metaphor we require simply 
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by extending the metaphor of the witness who may not be reliable. Shafer and 
Tversky [101], for example, give a metaphor for consonant belief functions 
[belief functions such that re(A) = 0 except for a nested family of subsets 
A] by imagining a witness whose statements may be meaningful to different 
degrees of exactitude, with different probabilities. 
In Ref. 86 I suggested a more abstract but very general metaphor--the 
metaphor of a randomly coded message. In this metaphor, we have proba- 
bilities for several codes that might be used to encode a message. We do not 
yet know what the message says, but we know it is true. We have this message 
in hand in its coded form, and we will try to decode it using each code, but the 
probabilities are judgments we make before this decoding. When we do decode 
using the different codes, we sometimes get nonsense and we sometimes get a 
comprehensible statement. It seems sensible, in this situation, to condition our 
probabilities for the codes by eliminating the ones with which we get nonsense. 
The conditioned probability for each remaining code can then be associated with 
the statement we get by decoding using that code. These statements may be re- 
lated in various ways; some may be inconsistent with each other, and some may 
be stronger than others. Thus we obtain the complexity of an arbitrary belief 
function. 
In this metaphor, the independence of two belief functions means that two 
different people independently choose codes with which to send two possibly 
different (though both true) messages. Our uncertainties about the codes in 
the two cases remain independent unless possible codes imply contradictory 
messages. If sl is a possible code for the first person, and s2 is a possible code 
for the second person, and the first message as decoded by sl contradicts the 
second message as decoded by s2, then it cannot be true that these were the two 
codes used. We eliminate such pairs of codes and normalize the probabilities 
of the remaining possible pairs. The probability of each pair is then associated 
with the conjunction of the two implied messages. This is Dempster's rule. 
Both the metaphor of the witness and the more general metaphor of the ran- 
domly coded message can be presented in a way that forestalls the interpretation 
of belief function degrees of belief in terms of bounds on probabilities. There 
is no probability model for the choice of the true message sent. The probabil- 
ities are only for the choice of codes. We might visualize these probabilities 
in terms of a repetition of the choice of codes, but since the true message can 
vary arbitrarily over this population of repetitions, the idea of this population 
does not lead to the idea of a true unknown probability for the true message or 
for the true answer to the question of interest. 
An insistence on imposing an overall Bayesian model on both the truth of the 
message and the choice of a code will lead, of course, to the conclusion that 
Dempster's rule is wrong. This has been shown in detail by Williams [131] and 
Good [39] (see also Shafer [90]). Related attempts to relate Dempster's rule to 
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overall Bayesian models include those of Freeling and Sahlin [36] and Baron 
[6]. 
Laskey [59] has given some examples that further illustrate the difference 
between belief unction thinking and a Bayesian approach to the randomly coded 
message metaphor. In Laskey's examples, strikingly different randomly coded 
messages produce the same belief function. These randomly coded messages 
would produce quite different Bayesian probabilities if combined with Bayesian 
priors about the true message. 
What other possibilities are there for a semantics for belief functions? Krantz 
[55] explored the possibility of justifying the rules for belief functions, includ- 
ing Dempster's rule, using measurement-type axioms. This offers at least a 
partial nonprobabilistic semantics for belief functions, because the axioms are 
concerned with comparisons of evidence and hence provide guidance in the as- 
sessment of evidential strength. I have been unable to convince myself, however, 
that this approach provides an understanding of the combination of evidence. In 
particular, it is difficult to justify Dempster's rule fully without a probabilistic 
basis for the concept of independence. 
Pearl [74] developed a metaphor involving random switches to provide a 
semantics for belief functions. Again, however, I have not been able to convince 
myself that this metaphor provides a full basis for Dempster's rule. It does not 
seem to provide a basis for normalization. 
In this section, I have used the word "semantics" in a process-oriented way. 
Semantics for a mathematical theory of evidence is guidance in using the theory 
to make quantitative judgments of the strength of evidence. The meaning of the 
resulting judgments is not independent of this process of judgment. 
Classical ogic and the classical frequentist and Bayesian theories of proba- 
bility all have a stronger conception of semantics. In all three cases, we can 
say what statements of the theory mean without reference to how they are ob- 
tained. In logic, the meaning of statements can be explained in terms of possible 
models or worlds. In frequentist probability, the meaning of statements can be 
explained in terms of actual frequencies. In Bayesian probability, the meaning 
of statements can be explained in terms of a person's willingness to bet. I do 
not believe, however, that such process-independent semantics i  a reasonable 
goal for AI. I agree with Winograd [133] that AI must use statements hat have 
no meaning "in any semantic system that fails to deal explicitly with the reason- 
ing process." One fundamental spect of the subjectivity of judgments under 
uncertainty is the fact that these judgements depend on the process by which 
they are made as well as on the objective nature of the evidence. 
8. SORTING EVIDENCE INTO INDEPENDENT ITEMS 
Dempster's rule should be used to combine belief functions that represent 
independent items of evidence. But when are items of evidence independent? 
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How can we tell? These are probably the questions asked most frequently about 
belief functions. 
The independence r quired by Dempster's rule is simply probabilistic inde- 
pendence applied to the questions for which we have probabilities rather than 
directly to the question of interest. In the metaphor of the randomly coded 
messages, this means that the codes are selected independently. In the more 
specialized metaphor of independent witnesses, it means that the witnesses (or 
at least their current properties as witnesses) are selected independently from 
well-defined populations. 
Whether two items of evidence are independent in a real problem is a sub- 
jective judgment, in the belief function approach as in the Bayesian approach. 
There is no objective test. 
In practice, our task is to sort out the uncertainties in our evidence. When 
items of evidence are not subjectively independent, we can generally identify 
what uncertainties they have in common, thus arriving at a larger collection of 
items of evidence that are subjectively independent. Typically, this maneuver 
has a cost--it forces us to refine, or make more detailed, the frame over which 
our belief functions are defined. We can illustrate this by adapting an example 
from Pearl [74]. 
Suppose my neighbor Mr. Watson calls me at my office to say he has heard 
my burglar alarm. In order to assess this testimony in belief function terms, I
assess probabilities for the frame 
$1 = {Watson is reliable, Watson is not reliable} 
Here Watson being reliable means he is honest and he can tell whether he is 
hearing my burglar alarm. I can use these probabilities to get degrees of belief 
for the frame 
T = {My alarm sounded, My alarm did not sound} 
Putting a probability of 90%, say, on Watson being reliable, I get a 90% degree 
of belief that my burglar alarm sounded and a 0% degree of belief that my 
burglar alarm did not sound. 
I now call another neighbor, Mrs. Gibbons, who verifies that my alarm 
sounded. I can assess her testimony in the same way, by assessing probabilities 
for the frame 
S 2 = {Gibbons is reliable, Gibbons is not reliable} 
Suppose I also put a probability of 95% on Gibbons being reliable, so that I 
again obtain a 95% degree of belief that my burglar alarm sounded and a 0% 
degree of belief that it did not sound. 
Were I to combine these two belief functions by Dempster's rule, I would 
obtain an overall degree of belief of 99.5% that my burglar alarm sounded. This 
is inappropriate, however, for the two items of evidence involve a common 
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uncertainty--whether there might have been some other noise similar to my 
burglar alarm. 
To deal with this problem, I must pull my skepticism about the possibility 
of a similar noise out of my assessment of Watson's and Gibbons's reliability, 
and identify my grounds for this skepticism as a separate item of evidence. So 
I now have three items of evidence--my evidence for Watson's honesty (I say 
honesty now instead of reliability, since I am not including here the judgment 
that there are no other potential noises in the neighborhood that Watson might 
confuse with my burglar alarm), my evidence for Gibbons's honesty, and my 
evidence that there are no potential noises in the neighborhood that sound like 
my burglar alarm. 
These three items of evidence are now independent, but their combina- 
tion involves more than the frame T. In its place, we need the frame U = 
{Ul, U2, U3} , where 
U l = My alarm sounded 
u2 = There was a similar noise 
u3 = There was no noise 
(Let us exclude, for simplicity of exposition, the possibility that there were two 
noises, my alarm and also a similar noise.) My first two items of evidence (my 
evidence for Watson's and Gibbons's honesty) both provide a high degree of 
belief in {Ul, u2}, and the third item (my evidence against he existence of 
other noise sources) provides a high degree of belief in {ul, u3 }. Combining 
the three by Dempster's rule produces a high degree of belief in {Ul }. 
A Bayesian approach to this problem would be somewhat different, but it too 
would involve refining the frame T to U or something similar. In the Bayesian 
case, we would ask whether the events "Watson says he heard a burglar alarm" 
and "Gibbons says she heard a burglar alarm" are subjectively independent. 
They are not unconditionally independent, but they are independent conditional 
on a specification of what noise actually occurred. I can exploit his conditional 
independence in assessing my subjective probabilities, but in order to do so I 
must bring the possibility of other noise into the frame. 
In the belief function approach, one talks not about conditional independence 
of propositions, but rather about the overlapping and interaction of evidence. 
For further explanation and more examples, see Shafer [82, Chap, 8; 86, 89, 
94] and Srivastava et al. [113]. 
9. STATISTICAL INFERENCE AND FREQUENCY REASONING 
Statistical inference is inference about frequencies from sample data. There 
are belief unction methods for statistical inference, as well as Bayesian and clas- 
sical frequentist methods. In this section, I discuss the relevance of statistical 
inference, and of frequency reasoning more generally, to the general problem 
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of subjective judgment. We can sometimes draw analogies between onsample 
evidence and imaginary data and hence use Bayesian or belief function meth- 
ods of statistical inference in nonstatistical problems. To do this successfully, 
however, we must distinguish clearly between frequencies and degrees of belief. 
The problem of statistical inference has two distinctive features, two features 
that distinguish it from the general problem of subjective judgment. First, the 
population that defines the frequencies i well defined. Second, we have sub- 
stantial sample data from that population. There are many reasons for wanting 
to know about frequencies in particular population. Sometimes we want to know 
about a population for its own sake. Sometimes knowledge about frequencies 
in a population may serve as evidence about causal mechanisms that mani- 
fest themselves in the population. Sometimes knowledge about frequencies in 
a population can help us make subjective judgments about a question that can 
be regarded as having its answer drawn randomly from the population. In the 
last two cases, statistical inference is only part of the undertaking, but it is an 
important part. 
The enduring philosophical conundrum of statistical inference is the fact that 
the sample data do not seem to provide a complete basis for making inferences 
about frequencies or about parameters in statistical models (models for frequen- 
cies). We must usually supplement these data with subjective judgment or with 
arbitrary choices. In the Bayesian case, we must supplement them with sub- 
jective probabilities based on evidence other than the sample data. In both the 
classical frequentist and belief function cases, there are usually several meth- 
ods of statistical inference for a given problem, and we must make an arbitrary 
choice among them. 
Classical frequentism is largely concerned with methods of estimating fre- 
quencies (or parameters that determine frequencies) from sample data and with 
estimating the average rror in the estimates. There are almost always com- 
peting estimators in a given problem, and the choice among these methods is 
not always clear-cut (Efron [32]). Bayesian methods give more complete and 
definite answers; they produce probability distributions for the frequencies or 
parameters. These probability distributions depend, however, on prior subjec- 
tive opinions as well as on the sample data (Savage [80], Lindley [63]). 
Dempster, in his original work on belief functions [17-23], was motivated by 
the desire to obtain probability judgments based only on sample data, without 
dependence on prior subjective opinion. His work, together with later work 
on belief function statistical inference (Krantz and Miyamoto [57], Shafer [82, 
83, 87, 88], Tritchler and Lockwood [119], Walley [121], Wasserman [123], 
Weisberg [126], and West [130]), has shown that this is possible. But this 
work has produced a variety of belief function methods, not a single prescribed 
method. In Ref. 88 I argued that we should choose among these methods by 
considering the nature of the evidence for the statistical model. But the evidence 
for the statistical model is often too nebulous for this approach to be helpful. 
Most problems of subjective judgment are not problems of statistical infer- 
344 Glenn Shafer 
ence, because there are neither sample data nor a well-defined population. In 
Section 2, I pointed out that the Bayesian approach, in general, draws an analogy 
between our actual evidence and knowledge of frequencies in a population. But 
usually this is only an analogy. The population in question is purely imaginary. 
Moreover, the analogy is with knowledge of frequencies, not with knowledge 
of sample data. 
In some cases, however, we can approach a problem of subjective judgement 
by drawing an analogy between certain items of evidence and imaginary sample 
data from a real or imaginary population. This will allow us to use Bayesian or 
belief function statistical methods even though we do not have real sample data. 
Suppose, for example, that we are interested in a bird named Tweety. We want 
to know whether Tweety flies and whether Tweety is a penguin. We decide to 
make judgements about this by defining a population of birds in some way and 
thinking of Tweety as randomly selected from this population. We have some 
opinions, based on fragmentary information, hunches, partial memories, and so 
on, about the proportion of birds in this population that fly and the proportion 
that are penguins. If  we can assess the strength of this evidence by saying that it 
is equivalent to certain sample data, then we can express this strength in terms 
of likelihoods, and then we can combine these likelihoods with other evidence 
in either a Bayesian or a belief function framework (Krantz [56]). The result 
would be probabilities about he frequencies in the population and, derivatively, 
probabilities about Tweety. 
It is important, if we follow this strategy of using statistical methods for 
nonstatistical evidence, to distinguish clearly between frequencies and degrees 
of belief. The frequencies, even if they are imaginary because the population is 
imaginary, should not be thought of as degrees of belief, because they are not 
taken as known. We are evaluating evidence for what these freqtrencies are. 
I emphasize the distinction between frequencies and degrees of belief be- 
cause it tends to disappear when we use the basic Bayesian analogy, without 
statistical methods. The basic Bayesian analogy is between our actual evidence 
and an ideal picture in which frequencies are known and hence equal to our 
degrees of belief. It is natural, when making this analogy, te say that the num- 
bers we produce are both degrees of belief and guesses at frequencies in an 
imaginary population. This basic Bayesian analogy will be needed even if we 
are using Bayesian statistical methods, for it is needed in assessing the prior 
subjective probabilities. Thus in a Bayesian statistical analysis for a nonstatis- 
tical problem, we will have some "frequencies" that are degrees of belief and 
other "frequencies" that are unknown. 
In the case of belief functions, a careless equating of frequency with degree 
of belief is especially dangerous. If our strategy of subjective judgment involves 
applying belief function methods of statistical inference to an imaginary pop- 
ulation, we must be clear whether a given number is a guess at a frequency 
or a degree of belief. Combining degrees of belief by Dempster's rule may be 
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appropriate. Combining different guesses about frequencies by Dempster's rule 
certainly is not. 
Consider, for example, our guesses about he proportion of birds in Tweety's 
population that fly and the proportion that are penguins. These guesses hould 
not be represented asbelief functions over a set of statements about Tweety and 
then combined by Dempster's rule. 
We can explain this in terms of our discussion of dependence in the preceding 
section. Both guesses bear on Tweety only through their accuracy as guesses 
about the population. This means that they have in common the uncertainty 
involved in choosing Tweety at random from the population. Depending on how 
we obtained the guesses, they may also have other uncertainties in common. 
Like every problem of dependence, we can deal with this problem within the 
belief function approach by sorting out the uncertainties and properly refining 
our frame. In this case we must bring the possible values for the population 
frequencies into the frame. We can then formalize the connection between these 
frequencies and Tweety as one of our items of evidence. We must also identify 
our sources of evidence about the frequencies, ort out their uncertainties, and 
use them to assess belief functions about what these frequencies are. 
Judea Pearl, in his article in this issue, gives some examples of misleading 
results that can arise from representing conditional probabilities as belief func- 
tions and then combining these conditional probabilities by Dempster's rule 
The error involved in these examples is the same as the error in the Tweety 
example; we are using Dempster's rule to combine fragments of information 
about frequencies in a given population. A legitimate belief function treatment 
must deal explicitly with the unknown overall frequency distribution and with 
the evidence about it. 
I do not believe, however, that applying belief function statistical methods 
to nonstatistical problems is the most promising direction for the use of belief 
functions. It is easy to talk about "the population of birds like Tweety." It is 
easy to talk about a population of repetitions for any particular observations 
whose evidential strength we want to assess. It is also easy to talk about causal 
models and conditional probabilities and populations of repetitions associated 
with them. But it is very hard to go beyond this talk and define these populations, 
even conceptually (Shafer [87]). The usually do not provide a good starting 
point either for Bayesian or belief function analyses. 
I also do not think that purely statistical problems are the most important do- 
main of application for belief functions. When adequate frequency information 
is available, there are usually many statistical methods from which to choose, 
and belief function methods, though reasonable, may be more complicated and 
unfamiliar than standard methods. Belief function representations of statistical 
evidence can be useful, however, when it is necessary to combine statistical 
and nonstatistical evidence (Dempster [26]). 
Belief functions are most useful precisely when it is not sensible to try to 
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embed the joint occurrence of all our evidence in an imaginary population 
of repetitions. Belief functions are appropriate when different populations of 
repetitions, real or imagined, justify probability judgments for different items 
of evidence and these populations bear on the question of interest and interact 
with each other in ways unique to each application. We saw this in the example 
of Section 4. The reliability of Sally and the reliability of Betty were both 
described in terms of imagined repetitions, repetitions in which Betty and Sally 
say many things about many things. But these reiiabilities were linked to my 
car through what Betty and Sally said this particular time. Dempster's rule for 
combining their testimony was based on this unique aspect of the testimony, 
and it cannot be related to a population of repetitions. 
10. COMPUTATION 
The use of belief functions can involve challenging computational problems. 
In this section, I explain why belief functions are computationally complex 
and briefly review some ways of dealing with this complexity. These include 
Barnett's algorithm for the special case of belief functions focused on singletons, 
Thoma's fast M6bius transform, and tree propagation. 
Why are belief functions computationally complex? A belief function Bel 
on a finite frame T with n elements is potentially far more complex than a 
probability measure P on the same frame. To specify a probability measure P, 
we need only n numbers--the probabilities P(t) for each t in T. To specify a 
belief function Bel, we may need as many as 2 n - 2 numbers--the degrees of 
belief BeI(A) for every proper nonempty subset of T. 
In practice, belief functions based on individual items of evidence do not 
approach this potential degree of complexity. Even if T is very large, we will try 
to sort our evidence into relatively simple items, each of which says something 
simple about T. We may have a problem, however, when we try to combine 
these belief functions by Dempster's rule. 
The potential problems in implementing Dempster's rule can be seen using 
any of the mathematical formulations of Section 5. If  we work with the basic 
probability assignment m, for example, then the straightforward approach is to 
implement formulas (3), (4), and (5). Each of these formulas is exponentially 
complex in itself, and each of them must be applied exponentially often-- once 
for each subset of T. 
One simple way to see the complexity that results from Dempster's rule is 
to count the potential focal elements of the belief functions involved. A focal 
element for a belief function with basic probability assignment m is a subset 
A such that m(A) ~ O. We might begin with belief functions with only a few 
focal elements. But we can see from (5) that the result of combining a belief 
function with r focal elements and a belief function with s focal elements will be 
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a belief function with as many as rs focal elements. Thus we may obtain a very 
complex belief function by combining a moderate number of belief functions 
that individually are not complex at all. 
The belief functions we want to combine are usually initially defined on many 
different frames. This is because the different items of evidence we consider all 
bear on slightly different questions. In order to combine the belief functions, 
however, we must consider all these questions together; we must work in a 
frame whose elements answer all the questions at once. This frame may be 
enormous, even though the initial frames are all small. It is in this enormous 
frame, in theory, that Dempster's rule must be carried out. This is why the 
computational complexity of belief functions is a real problem. 
Kong [52, 54] introduced the idea of discussing belief function combination 
in terms of variables. Conceptually, we can think of the elements of a frame T 
as the possible values of a variable X. In a problem of subjective judgment, we 
may be primarily interested in a variable X1, with a relatively small frame T1. 
But as we saw in Section 8, the different items of evidence that we are interested 
in, and their interaction, may force us to consider further variables. In general, 
we may be forced to consider a whole list of variables, say X2, X3 . . . . .  Xn,  
with frames T2, T3 . . . . .  Tn, respectively. Perhaps each item of evidence we 
consider is relevant o a few of these variables and hence each belief function 
we assess involves only the frame for a few variables. The first item of evidence 
might be relevant to the variables X , ,  X4, and X5, for example, and hence be 
representable by a belief function on the Cartesian product T1 × T4 × Ts. But 
if we want to combine all the evidence, we find ourselves working in the frame 
T1 x T2 x T3 x . . .  x Tn, which may be enormous if n is large. 
Barnett's Algorithm 
Barnett [5] gave algorithms for Dempster's rule for the special case in which 
each belief function supports either a single element of T or the complement of 
a single element. (More precisely, the focal elements for each belief function 
are either singletons or complements of singletons.) These algorithms are much 
better than the general algorithms; they are linear rather than exponential in the 
frame size. 
In order to understand the potential and the limits of Barnett's algorithm, we 
must take into account he multivariate nature of belief function computation. 
Individual items of evidence may in some cases produce belief functions that 
satisfy Barnett's conditions on a given frame. But as we study our problem, 
we will bring in new variables with new frames. A belief function that has 
singletons and their complements a focal elements in the frame T1 x T4 x T5 
will not have singletons and their complements as focal elements in the more 
refined frame T1 × T2 x T3 x • .- x Tn. In this more refined frame, the focal 
elements will be elements of a given partition and their complements. Thinking 
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of the belief unction in this larger frame does not invalidate Barnett's algorithm; 
it can be thought of as working on the partition. But a different item of evidence, 
assessed as a belief function satisfying Barnett's conditions on T3 × T4 x T6, 
say, will involve a different partition in T1 × T2 x T3 × • .. x Tn, and Baruett's 
algorithm will not enable us to combine the two belief functions. 
In practice, therefore, Barnett's algorithm must be supplemented by tech- 
niques for combining belief functions on related frames. Shafer and Logan [97] 
successfully used Barnett's algorithm in this way in the case of hierarchical 
evidence. 
Fast M6bius Transforms 
With care, we can reduce the complexity of Dempster's rule even in the 
general case, because much of the computation i  applying (3), (4), and (5) 
for each subset is repetitive. Thoma [ 118] has shown how this repetition can be 
eliminated; the result is a fast M6bius transform, analogous to the fast Fourier 
transform. 
It remains to be seen how useful the fast M6bius transform will be in prac- 
tice. It is clear, however, that it is not enough to make arbitrary belief function 
computations feasible. Even reducing the computational complexity from expo- 
nential to linear is not enough if the frame is enormous. 
Propagation in Trees 
More recent work on computation has focused on exploiting the pattern of 
evidence to reduce computation on very large frames to computation on many 
smaller frames. This can be done whenever individual items of evidence bear 
directly only on clusters of variables, and these clusters can be arranged in 
a join tree (Shafer et al. [102], Dempster and Kong [28], Shafer and Shenoy 
[98]). 
A tree in which the nodes are clusters of variables is called a join tree if 
whenever a variable is contained in two nodes of the tree it is also contained in 
all the nodes on the path between these two nodes. Figure 1 shows an example 
of such a tree. 
Suppose we have independent i ems of evidence beating on each cluster of 
variables in this tree. Each of these we represent by a belief function on the 
corresponding frame. The evidence bearing on X2, X3, and X4, for example, is 
represented by a belief function on T2 x Tax  T4. We want to combine all these 
belief functions on T1 x T2 × T3 × -.. × Tlo. It turns out that we can do this 
(at least we can get the values of the resultant belief unction for statements about 
individual variables and the given clusters of variables) by applying Dempster's 
rule repeatedly within the smaller frames corresponding to the clusters in the 
tree. The information from one cluster elevant to another cluster can be passed 
along the path between the two by means of messages between neighboring 
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Figure 1. A join tree with 10 variables. 
nodes that take the form of belief unctions for the variables that the neighboring 
nodes have in common. 
Work on belief functions in trees was initiated by the work of Gordon and 
Shortliffe [41, 42]. They were concerned with the problem of combining ev- 
idence by Dempster's rule when different items of evidence are relevant o 
different levels of specificity in a hierarchy of diseases. Gordon and Shortliffe's 
suggestion of approximating Dempster's rule in this case was strengthened by
Shafer and Logan [97] to an efficient method of computing the exact results of 
the rule. Shenoy and Shafer [106], Kong [52], and Shafer et al. [102] explained 
how this treatment of hierarchical evidence can be understood as a special case 
of propagation i trees. 
Bayesian and Belief Function Propagation 
Interest in belief function propagation was inspired not only by Gordon and 
Shortliffe's work but also by Pearl's work on Bayesian propagation [73], which 
was based on models of conditional independence. How is the algorithm for be- 
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lief function propagation i trees related to algorithms for Bayesian propagation 
in trees developed by Pearl and by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [61]? 
It is possible to regard the Bayesian algorithms as special cases of the belief 
function algorithm (Shenoy and Shafer [106], Shafer et al. [102], Zarley et al. 
[138]). In order to do this, however, each probability transition matrix, which 
provides the probabilities for one node as conditional probabilities given another 
node, must be represented bya belief unction. This can be done, but the way in 
which it is done is neither efficient nor conceptually satisfying. The probability 
transition matrices represent different fragments of information about a single 
frequency distribution, and, as I explained in Section 9, such fragments should 
not, in general, be represented by belief unctions and combined by Dempster's 
rule. 
Rather than treating the Bayesian algorithm as a special case of the belief 
function algorithm, therefore, we should think of them as two special cases of 
a more general algorithm. The scope of this more general algorithm has been 
demonstrated by Shenoy and Shafer [107]. It applies in any case where we have 
operations of marginalization a d combination that satisfy a few simple axioms 
(Shenoy [104, 105]). As it turns out, this viewpoint clarifies Bayesian as well 
as belief function propagation (Shafer and Shenoy [98, 99]). 
In both the belief function and Bayesian cases, join trees are more than 
computational tools. They are also conceptual tools, tools that we use in sorting 
out our evidence. In the Bayesian case, they provide a graphical representation 
of the conditional independence structure that is needed to make probability 
judgments manageable. In the belief unction case, they provide a representation 
of the sorting into independent uncertainties discussed in Section 8 (Dempster 
[26]). 
Networks 
When we sort our evidence into independent items, the clusters of variables 
that result may be such that they cannot be arranged in a join tree. This would 
be case in Figure 1, for example, if the variable X3 were added to the cluster 
Xt ,  X7. How to handle the computational problem in this case is a difficult 
problem in general. 
The most satisfactory solution to the problem, if possible, is to find a join 
tree with slightly larger clusters uch that each of the clusters with which we 
began can fit into a cluster in the tree. In the case of Figure 1 with X3 added 
to the cluster X6, X7, for example, we can obtain such a tree by also adding 
X3 to X2, X5, X6. 
Bayesian propagation also sometimes requires that we embed clusters of vari- 
ables in a join tree. Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [61] give one way of doing this; 
Kong [52, 53] gives another way, which usually results in a more manageable 
tree. How to embed collections of clusters in trees in the most efficient way is 
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the subject of a growing literature (Rose [75], Bertele and Brioschi [9], Tarjan 
and Yannakakis [117], Arnborg et al. [4], Mellonli [68], Zhang [140]). 
11. IMPLEMENTING BELIEF FUNCTIONS IN 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Belief functions have been implemented in a wide variety of expert systems, 
and I am not prepared to evaluate or even list these implementations. The imple- 
mentations I find most convincing, however, are those designed for interactive 
use. These include Gister (Lowrance et al. [65]), Russell Almond's program 
(Almond [1]), DELIEF (Zarley et al. [13]), AUDITOR's ASSISTANT (Shafer 
et al. [103]), and MacEvidence (Hsia and Shenoy [44]). These systems help hu- 
man users build and evaluate belief networks. They require the user to make the 
judgments of independence that justify the network and to provide the numerical 
judgments of support based on each item of evidence. 
Interactive systems eem appropriate to belief functions, since the theory 
practically requires that the relation between evidence and questions of interest 
should be unique to each application. Many probabilistic systems--such asthe 
HUGIN system for medical diagnosis (Anderson et al. [2])--apply the same 
conditional independence structure and, for the most part, the same numerical 
judgments to each new case. This means relating the entire structure of the 
evidence in each case to the same population of repetitions. As I have already 
argued, belief unctions are appropriate osituations where this direct frequentist 
application of probability is not possible-- situations where different populations 
of repetitions, real or imagined, justify probability judgments for different items 
of evidence, and these populations bear on the question of interest and interact 
with each other in ways unique to each application. Such uniqueness means that 
the belief network and the numerical judgments must be constructed anew for 
each case. 
The next step, of course, is to automate this constructive process. This is 
difficult, but some progress has been made (Lowrance [64], Andress and Kak 
[3], Biswas and Anand [10], Laskey et al. [60]). 
Ultimately, it would be desirable to automate not only the construction of 
belief networks but also numerical assessment. I am not aware of current work in 
this direction, but current ideas in distributed memory (Kanerva [48]) encourage 
the idea that there is enough independence in such memories to permit he use 
of Dempster's rule. 
12. OTHER TOPICS 
In this final section, I briefly discuss several topics: generalizations of be- 
lief function theory, decision methods based on belief functions, methods for 
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reaching consensus using belief functions, work on belief function weights of 
evidence, and other mathematical work, especially on infinite frames. 
Generalizations 
One way to generalize belief function theory is to retain the class of belief 
functions and generalize Dempster's rule for combining belief functions. I have 
discussed some generalizations that allow for dependent evidence [93, 94], but 
I am not aware of practical applications of these generalizations. In my view, 
the theory of belief functions hould be used as a way of examining evidence 
(Dempster [25]), and in the examples I have thought about, this seems to lead 
to sorting out the independencies in the evidence, as in the example of Section 
8. 
Another approach is to retain the class of belief functions but generalize the 
idea of a compatibility relation to allow for partial or probabilistic compatibility 
(Kohlas [51], Yen [135]). In some cases, this idea can be seen not as a general- 
ization at all, but rather as an introduction of frames intermediate between the 
S and T of Section 5. In other cases, the probabilistic basis of belief functions 
is lost, and the rationale for the generalization is not clear (Dubois and Prade 
[29]). 
Finally, we can generalize the class of belief functions to more general set 
functions. Going in one direction, this takes us to the lower-probability heory 
discussed in Section 6 and even to versions of lower-probability heory that 
generalize probability bounds (Walley and Fine [122], Wasserman and Kadane 
[125]). Going in another direction, away from probability but toward a variety 
of rules of combination, we enter the vast literature on fuzzy sets (Dubois and 
Prade [29, 30]). 
Decision Methods 
Tom Strat, in his article in this volume, sets out a natural approach to decision 
theory within the belief function framework. The basic idea, that of upper and 
lower expectations, can also be found in Choquet [13] and Dempster [17]. 
Examples and practical elaborations are given by Wesley [127, 128] and Wesley 
et al. [129]. 
Variations on this basic idea are possible, but I am not aware of extensive x- 
plorations of them. Two brief explorations can be found in Shafer [91, response 
to discussion] and Dempster and Kong [27]. 
Another approach to relating belief unctions to decision theory is to apply the 
usual von Neumann-Morgenstern theory to the linear space of belief functions. 
Jaffray [46] has developed this approach. 
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Consensus for Befief Functions 
Rationales for average or consensus belief functions for group decision have 
been developed by Wagner [120] and Williams [132]. In Ref. 92, however, I 
argued against global consensus methods and in favor of direct reassessment by
the group of the different items of evidence that contribute to a belief function. 
Infinite Frames 
Because my 1976 book dealt only with the case where the frame T is finite, 
some readers were left with the impression that the theory of belief functions 
had been developed only for this case. In fact, however, Dempster's articles 
had dealt from the outset with the continuous case. This is natural in the context 
of parametric statistical inference, since even the set of possible values for a 
single unknown probability is a continuous interval. 
Dempster's early work included a treatment of the mathematics of belief 
functions generated by random closed intervals (Dempster [20]). This topic 
was also treated by Strat [114]. 
In general, the mathematical study of belief functions on continuous paces 
will employ various regularity conditions, analogous to countable additivity or to 
familiar topological conditions in probability theory. These include topological 
conditions (Zhang and Wang [114]) or mere sequential continuity, analogous to 
countable additivity (Ross [76]). My own contributions to belief functions [83, 
85] on continuous frames emphasized the condition of condensability, which 
was satisfied by the belief functions tudied by Dempster. A condensable belief 
function is one for which the plausibility of every set A can be approximated 
by finite subsets of A; this expresses very strongly the intuition that in the case 
of subjective judgment, continuous mathematics should not be considered more 
than a convenient approximation to something fundamentally finite. 
Weights of Evidence 
My original purpose in writing the 1976 monograph was to explain an un- 
solved mathematical problem, which I called the weight of conflict conjecture. 
This conjecture derived from the idea of associating a weight of evidence to 
a belief function that supports a single subset of a frame to a certain degree. 
Such a belief function is called a simple support function. If A is the subset 
it supports, then the weight of evidence in favor of A is - log[1 - BeI(A)]. 
Weights of evidence add when simple support functions are combined by Demp- 
ster's rule. As I showed, all belief functions on finite frame s can be obtained 
by combining simple support functions, reducing to coarser frames, and taking 
limits. Thus a belief function can always be understood in terms of a collection 
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of weights of evidence. There is a possibility of competing representations by 
weights of evidence, however, because a given belief function can be obtained 
by coarsening in more than one way. The weight-of-conflict conjecture, if true, 
pointed to a way in which the competing representations would be in agree- 
ment. This conjecture remains unsettled, but the conjectured agreement was 
established by a different argument by Zhang [139]. The possibility of using 
weights of evidence in belief function applications remains largely unexploited. 
Other Mathematical Advances 
Berres [7] showed that products of belief functions are always belief func- 
tions. This has possible applications in the context of discounting belief func- 
tions (Sharer [87]). Berres [8] gave a comprehensive r view of the relation 
between belief functions and Sugeno's X-additive measures (Sugeno [115]). 
Another interesting advance is the extension to belief functions of ideas of in- 
formation and entropy that have been associated with probability distributions 
(Smets [108], Yager [134]). 
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